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I. Introduction
In this article I seek to locate — in space and time, and in Somali 
diaspora studies — that group within the ethnic Somali diaspora that 
identifies its “homeland” as the eastern part of Ethiopia, which in 1995 
became Somali Regional State under Ethiopia’s federal constitution. 
“Ethiopian Somali” remains for many Somalis a contested identifier, 
and yet as Hagmann and Khalif argue, the “invention” of such an iden-
tity “bears symbolic significance, as it had hitherto been regarded as 
something out of the question.”1 “Ethiopian” seems, for many Somalis 
as well as in much of general public consciousness in the West, primar-
ily a reference to highland Amhara, Tigrayan, and related populations. 
In numerous studies of populations from the broader Horn of Africa 
now living abroad, the dichotomy has tended to reinscribe Somali and 
Ethiopian groups as separable, under the assumption that Somalis are 
from Somalia and that Ethiopian “ethnicity” is defined by the highland 
groups known as Habesha (or Abyssinian). To distinguish ethnicity 
from nationality, I will use the term “Somalian” to denote nationals 
of the Somali Republic. More generally, such approaches tend to treat 
diasporas (and ethnic groups) as always-already-existing communi-
ties. An approach to diaspora as a category of identification that can be 
defined and mobilized in various ways, by various actors, provides a 
more nuanced framework to investigate the interplay of Ethiopian and 
Somali identities and identifications in diaspora.2 
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It seems standard practice in studies of ethnic Somalis outside the 
Horn of Africa to note somewhere in an introductory or “background” 
section that ethnic Somalis make up significant proportions of the pop-
ulation in Djibouti and in the eastern parts of Ethiopia and Kenya — 
and then to proceed by deploying the term “Somali” in a dual sense 
of both Somali ethnicity and Somalian nationality. To some extent, 
this reflects the reality that during the 1960s all ethnic Somalis were in 
principle granted Somalian citizenship — and furthermore that many 
ethnic Somalis born and raised in Ethiopian territory moved to Soma-
lia prior to going abroad (including a large population of ethnic Somali 
refugees that left Ethiopia for Somalia in 1977–78 as refugees). The 
question of an Ethiopian Somali (or Somali Ethiopian)3 — that is, eth-
nically Somali, nationally Ethiopian — political identity has recently 
come to the fore in emerging regional political formations explored by 
Hagmann and Khalif as well as Markakis.4 Yet such shifts in identity 
are not confined to Ethiopia’s full-time residents: Ethiopia’s implemen-
tation of fiscal decentralization has proceeded in tandem with increas-
ing efforts at diaspora engagement. The Ethiopian government began 
issuing Ethiopian nationality documents, “Yellow Cards,” to diaspora 
members in 2002. Regional governments have offices devoted exclu-
sively to mobilizing “their” diasporas. The assertion that, as one man 
in Atlanta, Georgia, told me, in the wake of ethnic-federal decentral-
ization, “We are more Ethiopian than before,”5 is reflected in a large 
influx of Somali diaspora return to Somali Regional State (SRS) and 
increasing efforts of the SRS government to encourage diaspora return 
and harness diaspora finance for regional development.6
The mobilization of an Ethiopian-Somali diaspora defined by a new 
“ethnicized” state structure in Ethiopia provides an opportunity to 
examine more carefully the social construction and deployment of the 
categories of Ethiopian and Somali, and to explore their overlaps and 
disjunctures. In the analysis that follows, I focus on one small slice of 
this problem, first by reviewing whether and how Ethiopian Somalis 
feature in Somali diaspora studies, and second by analyzing datasets 
on immigration and ethnicity in the United States to discern whether 
Ethiopian Somalis are “visible,” so to speak, in such population statis-
tics. My purpose is not to propose a sharp analytic differentiation of 
the Somali diaspora into distinct national groups such as “Somalian 
Somalis,” “Ethiopian Somalis,” “Kenyan Somalis,” and so on. Such a 
task is neither possible nor desirable, and while complicating an overly 
simplistic view of the Somali diaspora, would reinscribe the “national 
order of things” in scholarship in a different way.7
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Confronting this problem from one side is evidence that many eth-
nic Somalis outside of the Horn retain a sense of identity in terms 
of a broad Somali diaspora.8 On the other side is evidence in certain 
contexts that claims to “Somaliness” have been deployed by ethnic 
Somalis from Ethiopia and Kenya — and even by individuals identify-
ing themselves as belonging to non-Somali groups from the Horn — 
because Somalis are so widely recognized as a refugee population with 
“legitimate” cause for migration.9 Ethnic and national categorizations 
are often flexible and may become salient in certain contexts or even 
in relation to particular questions posed by researchers or govern-
ment officials. Thus, it is crucial to focus on how such categorizations 
are deployed by various interest groups (including migrant groups, 
researchers, government officials, and others), the extent to which such 
categorizations mask potent realities, and the circumstances under 
which categories shift.
In the first section, I briefly review academic approaches to Somali 
diaspora studies, with a focus on how the interplay of Somali eth-
nicity and Somalian nationality has figured in the literature. I argue 
that studies of the Somali diaspora have tended to naturalize connec-
tions between Somalis and Somalia, reinscribing a “national order of 
things” in much of the academic literature. Although Somali ethnic-
ity and nationality are not neatly separable, one significant problem 
with this trend is that it affirms the idea that nation-states are homog-
enous spaces and by extension that, for example, people from Somalia 
deserve opportunities to migrate as refugees because they come from 
a “failed state,” whereas other people whose states have allegedly not 
“failed” have less reason or right to move across international borders. 
This assumption disregards their individual experiences or the degree 
of marginalization of their “home community” in the country of ori-
gin. Another is that such a framework has difficulty accounting for 
shifts in identity accompanying political changes such as the redraw-
ing of political boundaries. 
In the second section, I look at the ways that people who were 
born in, or trace their ancestry to, countries of the Horn of Africa have 
been categorized according to ethnicity and nationality in U.S. popula-
tion estimates, and what the discrepancies among ethnic and national 
categories reveal about the Ethiopian-Somali diaspora. My analysis 
of these quantitative data, corroborated by interviews from an ongo-
ing study among Somalis in Atlanta and diaspora returnees in Jigjiga, 
Somali Regional State, indicates the substantial presence of non-Soma-
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lian Somalis in the United States. It further suggests that in recent years 
a growing segment of this population has begun explicitly identifying 
itself as Ethiopian and Somali. These indications should challenge both 
academic research on the Somali diaspora and popular and political 
discourse about Somali refugees in order to pay attention to patterns 
of identity, allegiance, and migration that cross-cut the ethnic Somali 
diaspora and complicate overly simplistic portrayals of Somalis.
II. Somalis and Somalia in Diaspora Studies
Following the collapse of Somalia’s government in 1991, an exist-
ing body of literature on regional sociopolitical trends in the Horn 
expanded into a rather enormous body of literature focused on “Soma-
lis,” “Somali refugees,” and “Somali migrants” in refugee camps and 
in countries of settlement from the Middle East to southern Africa to 
North America and Australia/New Zealand. The diversity of topics 
and scopes within this large body of literature makes it difficult to 
generalize trends or compare across studies. Many studies limit their 
scope such that the differentiation of Somali migrants into different 
national, regional, or clan groups, and discussion of such differentia-
tion are largely irrelevant. 
Recognizing the important merits of previous studies and the (often 
major) differences in focus between my analysis and that of other 
researchers, I reviewed a selection of recent studies of Somali migra-
tion, simply asking three questions of each publication: (1) does the 
study mention Somalis indigenous to Djibouti, Ethiopia, or Kenya; (2) 
does the study recognize the ambiguity of the term “Somali” as denot-
ing ethnicity and nationality; and (3) does the study mention Somalis 
from Djibouti, Ethiopia, or Kenya as members of Somali migrant and 
diaspora groups? In addition to these three questions that I consider 
key issues relating to studies focused on Somalis, I also asked whether 
the study mentioned Oromos, since significant numbers of Oromos 
live in what are often termed Somali areas in the literature (for exam-
ple, Cedar-Riverside, Minneapolis; Mayfair, Johannesburg; and Eastle-
igh, Nairobi). I have separated this question from the others because it 
may be outside the scope of some studies that purport to limit them-
selves to studying Somalis, and also because among the publications 
reviewed, only studies that answered all three main questions in the 
affirmative also mentioned the presence of Oromos.
5The selection includes fifty-two books, peer-reviewed academic arti-
cles, and reports funded by governments and development agencies, 
all published between 1991 and early 2017. The entire selection fell 
generally into three social-scientific categories: studies of forced migra-
tion trends; development and livelihoods at “home” and in diaspora; 
and assimilation, identity formation, and exclusion in host societies. It 
was intentionally selected to represent studies across four continents 
(North America, Europe, Australia/New Zealand, and Africa) and six-
teen countries, and include works by Somali academics. Many of the 
works were read closely as they are informing the background of a 
broader ongoing study. However, given the volume of literature, I 
used indexes, electronic search tools, and skimming of relevant sec-
tions for some of the works. That is to say, what is presented here is a 
suggestion of trends rather than purporting to be a complete analysis 
of every published work on the Somali diaspora. Twenty-nine of the 
fifty-two publications (56%) did not mention the historical presence 
of ethnic Somalis in countries neighboring Somalia, used “Somali” 
without noting the ambiguity of the term as denoting ethnicity and 
nationality, and they appeared to assume — implicitly or explicitly — 
that Somalis in diaspora were from Somalia, rather than potentially 
from Djibouti, Ethiopia, or Kenya (see Table 1). Only six publications 
(12%) were given a positive indication in all three categories. Of these, 
five also mentioned Oromos living alongside Somalis in the Horn or in 
diaspora.
Table 1: Mentions of Non-Somalian Somalis and  
Mentions of Oromos in Studies of the Somali Diaspora
Total studies reviewed 52
Mentions Somalis as indigenous in Djibouti, Ethiopia,  
and/or Kenya 18
Distinguishes Somali as ethnicity from nationality,  
or recognizes ambiguity of term 10
Recognizes ethnic Somalis from Djibouti/Ethiopia/Kenya 
among diaspora 11
Mentions all of the above 6
Mentions none of the above 29
Mentions Oromos as frequently living in same  
locations as Somalis 5
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In terms of providing nuance to the “national order of things,” the 
most common approach in selected studies of the Somali diaspora 
appears to be: (a) mention of the presence of ethnic Somalis in Dji-
bouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya; and then (b) proceeding to discuss Somalis 
as if all come from Somalia. Where the literature notes the presence 
of Somalis in Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya, it is often discussed in 
somewhat vague terms that imply that these may have already been 
refugees from Somalia, rather than indigenous inhabitants of these 
territories. In one description, after 1991, Somalis became “refugees, 
scattered in Kenya, Ethiopia, Western Europe, North America, and 
Australasia.”10 Where indigenous populations of ethnic Somalis are 
recognized, there is a frequent tendency to represent their existence as 
somewhat anomalous: “many people who have lived all their lives in 
Ethiopia, Kenya and Djibouti,” writes one author, “still consider them-
selves as Somalis.”11
When the presence of ethnic Somalis from Djibouti, Ethiopia, and 
Kenya among the Somali diaspora is recognized (which is much less 
frequent than noting that ethnic Somalis live in these countries), it is 
often mentioned in passing or as an aside. Three studies from South 
Africa are revealing in their different modes of recognizing the mixed 
national origins of the Somali diaspora. A report on Somali businesses 
in Cape Town’s townships notes that, “Somalis also fled from the 
Somali region of Ethiopia.”12 This reflects a general recognition that 
this population exists as a subset of Somalis in South Africa, but also 
the reality that this population is difficult to separate from Somalians 
unless research informants are explicit about their background. In an 
article on Somalis in Johannesburg, one informant is forthcoming, but 
it appears in the article almost as an afterthought. “The British gave 
our own part to Ethiopia,” the author quotes this informant as say-
ing; “these Somalians they do not say we are Ethiopians . . . even the 
government does not recognize us as Ethiopians.”13 My own previous 
research in South Africa suggests that ethnic Somalis from Ethiopia 
and Kenya sometimes seek and receive the same legal status as refu-
gees from Somalia under the assumption by immigration officials that 
if someone speaks Somali, they must be from Somalia.14 The study also 
indicated the significant presence of ethnic Oromos from Ethiopia and 
Kenya in the neighborhood of Mayfair that other authors describe only 
in terms of ethnic Somalis. The presence of non-Somalian Somalis in 
South Africa, and of Oromo, Gabra, and other ethnicities among the 
7Somali community in these spaces, raises the issue of the extent to 
which similar conditions are discernible elsewhere.
A. The Somali Diaspora and the Ethiopian Diaspora
Though I reviewed Ethiopian diaspora literature much less thor-
oughly than that of the Somali diaspora, studies of Ethiopians abroad 
often succumb to similar pitfalls as literature on Somali migration. A 
number of studies of the Ethiopian diaspora employ the term “Ethio-
pian” loosely to denote both nationality and ethnicity.15 A few more 
nuanced studies recognize the diversity of ethnicities covered within 
the term “Ethiopian” or explicitly mention various ethnic groups.16 
In general, the ethnic identification of an Ethiopian diaspora appears 
to correspond largely with Abyssinian/Habesha ethnicity (Amhara 
and Tigray). Where Somalis are mentioned in studies of Ethiopians, it 
tends to be as a group compared to “Ethiopians.”17 The complexity of 
how groups like Oromo and Somali, historically marginalized in the 
Ethiopian state, might fit into these identifications is captured by one 
outspoken Oromo nationalist. “Ethiopia is a symbol of racial/ethnon-
ational oppression and exploitation,” he writes, and Oromos “never 
assumed an Ethiopian identity for themselves.”18
The issues of Oromo and Ethiopian-Somali populations in diaspora 
are intertwined not only with regard to the seeming invisibility of these 
groups in many studies and statistical datasets, but also with regard to 
the practical fact that ethnic Oromo — especially Muslim Oromo from 
eastern and southern Ethiopia — frequently live and work in the same 
neighborhoods as Somalis in diaspora. Indeed, both in the Horn and 
in diaspora the borders between these groups are extremely fuzzy, 
with ethnic Oromo living in Somalia and Kenya, significant mixing 
between Oromo and Somali, and a number of smaller ethnic groups 
that self-identify with one group or another while speaking the other’s 
language or engaging in cultural practices identified with the other 
group (e.g., Garre, Geri, Jarso). In their focus on one group or another, 
many studies of migrant groups from the Horn have elided the over-
laps and interactions among such groups. For example, one could read 
a number of studies about Somalis in the Cedar-Riverside neighbor-
hood of Minneapolis, Minnesota — or the 8th Avenue, Mayfair area of 
Johannesburg, South Africa — and never realize that a large number of 
Oromo live and interact closely with Somalis in these spaces.
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B. Political Effects of Categorizations and Generalizations
The point to be made is that these trends have a tendency to rein-
scribe a sort of “national order of things” in conceptualizations and 
discussions of Somali and Ethiopian diasporas. By reinscription, I 
intend, following Gupta, the reproduction of links between boundar-
ies of identity groups and geopolitical/territorial formations. Gupta 
argues that, “we need to pay attention to the structures of feeling that 
bind people to geographical units larger or smaller than nations or 
that crosscut national boundaries.”19 I would add that we need to pay 
attention to how such identifications of people with places come to 
the fore in certain instances; how they are mobilized by people in their 
own interests; and how they are utilized as mechanisms of monitoring 
and control, for instance by governments. In general, three such modes 
of reinscription are worth mentioning with regard to how conceptual-
izations of diaspora groups generate political effects.
First, there is the well-researched issue of racial-national stereo-
typing that underpins anti-migrant discourse and sometimes violent 
attacks on migrant groups. Research on Somalis reveals the prevalence 
of such stereotypes in media portrayals of Somalis as “pirates,” “ter-
rorists,” or otherwise disorderly people.20 In South Africa, public dis-
courses accuse Muslim migrants from the Horn of financing terrorism 
and threatening to destroy South Africa “the way they destroyed their 
countries.”21 Strikingly, in South Africa such discourses have served in 
some contexts to organize and legitimate anti-migrant violence. In the 
U.S., similar dynamics threaten to break out: in October 2016, in the 
context of broader public anti-immigrant discourses voiced by presi-
dential candidate Donald Trump and some of his supporters, three 
middle-aged white Americans were arrested in Garden City, Kansas, 
and charged with “conspiring to set off a bomb where about 120 peo-
ple — including many Muslim immigrants from Somalia — live and 
worship.”22
Second, official categorizations of people according to ethnicity and 
nationality can be used as mechanisms of state control in ways that 
reinscribe stereotypes and reproduce the very characterizations that 
are deemed to be “natural” (or, perhaps not much better, “cultural”) 
aspects of particular groups. With regard to Somalis, a fascinating 
example of this is the way in which Swedish migration officers have 
tested Somali asylum applicants to see if they are “really Somali” by 
asking applicants questions about local places and about their clan 
9lineage — a supposedly ubiquitous feature of Somali culture. In such 
cases, officials have documents containing “local” information about 
locales in Somalia and clan lineages against which they test applicants’ 
answers.23
Third, indigenous categorizations are often much more flexible and 
multi-layered than either simplistic stereotypes or official labels, and 
yet interact with these two previously considered modes of inscription. 
Exclusionary discourses may reinforce boundary-making and self-
exclusion among foreign-born populations,24 and state categorizations 
of certain people as belonging, or having more rights to movement 
than others, clearly have an impact on the structure of diaspora groups 
by shaping continued patterns of migration.
There are numerous practical and theoretical reasons to challenge 
the “national order of things” as an overly simplistic view of reality. 
In the remainder of this article, I use quantitative data on migration 
and ethnicity, along with data from interviews with Somalis in Atlanta 
and Jigjia, to reveal two trends among populations in the United States 
that complicate the idea of distinct ethnic identities isomorphic with 
national origins. After introducing the general trends and estimates 
of Somalis and Ethiopians in the U.S., I will argue that data from the 
American Communities Survey (ACS) indicate a substantial popula-
tion of non-Somalian Somalis and a sharp uptick in the population 
reporting Ethiopian and Somali ancestry over the past decade.
III. Visualizing the Ethiopian-Somali Diaspora25
Amidst the political turmoil surrounding the end of the Cold War, 
population movements across national borders in the Horn created a 
maze of migration trajectories within and beyond the region. In the late 
1980s and early 1990s, the bulk of documented migrant populations 
from countries in the Horn were within the region. In 1990, Somalia’s 
Ethiopia-born population was estimated at 460,000, because refu-
gees — including thousands of Somalis — had fled the ongoing war 
against the Derg. It is revealing of the turmoil in the Horn that in the 
same year, Ethiopia’s Somalia-born population was estimated at over 
600,000, many of whom were fleeing political violence in Somaliland 
and increasing repression in southern Somalia (Figure 1). After 1991, 
both of these populations declined. In 1995, the Ethiopia-born popula-
tion in Somalia was estimated to be only 18,000, and the Somalia-born 
population in Ethiopia had also dropped significantly to 460,000.
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Figure 1: Ethiopia-Born (top) and Somalia-Born (bottom) Populations  
Living Abroad, 1990. Map by author, using data from UNDESA (2015).
While there were a small number of earlier migrations, Ethiopians 
began arriving in the U.S. by the thousands after the 1974 revolu-
tion overthrew Emperor Haile Selassie. The number of refugee arrivals 
climbed in the 1980s as war against the socialist Derg regime acceler-
ated, ravaging large parts of Ethiopian territory. Poverty and political 
upheavals in the province of Eritrea (part of Ethiopia from 1952 until 
1993), in Djibouti, and in Somalia after the 1977–78  Ogaden War, led 
to dramatic population movements within the region as well as large-
scale migration abroad. By 2015, the U.S. had the largest Ethiopia-
born population outside of Ethiopia (184,022) as well as the largest 
Eritrea-born population outside of Africa (30,305). By 2015 the Kenya-
born population in the U.S. had multiplied sevenfold since 1990. The 
Somalia-born population in the U.S. was estimated at 2,400 in 1990 
(compared to 34,800 Ethiopia-born) but jumped to nearly 19,000 by 
11
1995. In 2015, UN estimates place the U.S. as having the fourth-largest 
Somalia-born population (145,579) after Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen.26 
(Figures 2 and 3).
Figure 2: Ethiopia-Born (top) and Somalia-Born (bottom) Populations  
Living Abroad, 2015. Map by author, using data from UNDESA (2015).
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Figure 3: Total U.S. Resident Population Born in Ethiopia, Kenya, and 
Somalia, 1990–2015. Data from UNDESA (2015).
Within the United States, the bulk of eastern-Africa-born populations 
are concentrated in a relatively small number of metropolitan regions. 
Estimates from the 2015 American Communities Survey show popu-
lations of over 10,000 people born in eastern Africa in eight counties: 
Montgomery County, Maryland, and Fairfax County, Virginia (metro 
Washington, D.C.); DeKalb County, Georgia (metro Atlanta); Frank-
lin County, Ohio (Columbus); Hennepin County, Minnesota (Minne-
apolis); Dallas County, Texas; King County, Washington (Seattle); and 
Los Angeles County, California. Counties with populations of at least 
5,000 eastern-Africa-born are clustered around these areas as well as 
in Boston, Chicago, Phoenix, Las Vegas, San Diego, and Houston. Of 
these, Montgomery County, Maryland, and King County, Washington, 
both have Ethiopia-born populations of over 10,000, while Hennepin 
County is the only U.S. county with an estimated Somalia-born popu-
lation of more than 10,000 in 2015.
According to Somali community leaders and Ethiopia-born Somalis 
who arrived during the 1980s and early 1990s in DeKalb County, Geor-
gia, Ethiopian Somalis were in many cases among the first Somalis to 
settle in areas that are now known as hotspots of Somali populations 
in the U.S. One Somalia-born business owner and community leader in 
Atlanta estimates the following numbers:
13
When I came here in 1993, it was probably 80% Ethiopian Somalis, 
mostly Jigjiga people and others from that part of Ethiopia. Now a lot 
of people came from Somalia, so probably 80% of people in this area 
now are from Somalia, and 20% from Ethiopia and Kenya. People from 
Ethiopia were the first wave — you know, after the 1977 War, they were 
in refugee camps in Somalia and some got a chance to come to the U.S.27
Indeed, amidst the diversity of backgrounds and migration trajectories 
among ethnic Somalis in metropolitan Atlanta, the bulk of those who 
arrived earliest and are seen as having established the ethnic Somali 
community are people from Ethiopia’s Somali region who arrived 
through various means (refugee resettlement, educational visas, family 
sponsorship) in 1982–85. Oromos arriving in the same years frequently 
settled in the same neighborhoods. One Somali informant originally 
from Jigjiga arrived in Atlanta in 1992 and soon thereafter went to visit 
a contact in Minneapolis to ascertain employment opportunities. He 
recalls his perception of what is now a well-known bastion of Somali 
settlement, Cedar-Riverside: “You know Cedar? Only Oromo were 
there; no Somali. The old Minneapolis Somalis had one, two families, 
and I think three or four singles. That’s it. And then the two families, 
even they moved from Atlanta.”28
Both in terms of numbers and in terms of paving the way for the 
influx of Somalian refugees after 1990, the population of Ethiopia-born 
Somalis as well as Muslim Oromos, who arrived in North America in 
the 1970s and 1980s, are too significant to overlook if one is researching 
the Somali diaspora. Given the diversity within the Somali diaspora, 
it is worth recognizing that some groups of Ethiopian Somalis may be 
clustered in certain areas more than others. As the informant quoted 
above notes, among the first Somalis to settle in the Clarkston and 
Stone Mountain area of DeKalb County, Georgia (metro Atlanta) were 
Jigjiga people of the Bartirre and Yeberre clans (sometimes termed 
“junior clans”29 of the Darood clan family). These groups have a com-
plex history of relationship with Ethiopia, since agricultural sections of 
the Bartirre appear in written records as probably the earliest Somali 
sociopolitical group to come under Ethiopian control (around 1890). 
Other Somali clans that identify themselves with territories that strad-
dle the Ethiopia-Somalia border may be even less likely to identify 
themselves as originating in Ethiopian territory unless questioned in 
detail about their origins, let alone to identify themselves as “Ethiopian 
Somali.”
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While a community-level analysis of the numerical proportions 
of Ethiopian Somalis in the Atlanta Somali population is beyond the 
scope of this study (and in any case would not necessarily correspond 
with Ethiopian-Somali populations elsewhere in the U.S.), I undertook 
to determine the extent to which Ethiopian Somalis may be visible in 
the American Communities Survey data, published through the U.S. 
Census Bureau. These aggregated data have county-level estimates 
of populations reporting ethnicity and nationality, but not of specific 
overlaps between the two; for example, of Ethiopia- or Kenya-born 
ethnic Somalis. Thus, in considering the presence of such populations 
in the data, I rely on the relationships between reported ethnicity/
ancestry and nationality, using geographical statistical regions rather 
than individuals as units of analysis. In the following subsections, I 
argue first that differences between Somalia-born and Somali-ancestry 
populations corroborate accounts suggesting that a significant por-
tion — about 20% or more — of the Somali population of the U.S. 
traces their ancestry (nationality by birth, among first-generation 
immigrants) to Ethiopia or Kenya rather than Somalia. Furthermore, 
analyzing ACS data on multiple ancestry tentatively indicates that the 
population explicitly identifying itself as Ethiopian and Somali has 
increased sharply in recent years, during the same time that a wave of 
return migration to Somali Regional State of Ethiopia has accelerated.
The 2009–2014 ACS datasets30 available through the U.S. Census/
ACS Application Programming Interface (API) for R31 include esti-
mates of populations born in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, and “other east-
ern African countries,” as well as estimates of populations of Eritrean, 
Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Somali ancestry, categorized into individuals 
reporting single ancestry and individuals reporting multiple ancestry.32 
Notably, estimates of populations born in Somalia are not available in 
these data for years prior to 2015. Using these data, I employed two 
approaches to assess whether non-Somalian ethnic Somali populations 
were discernible. The first analyzes relationships between estimated 
foreign-born populations from the Horn of Africa and estimates of 
populations claiming ancestry from countries in the Horn. The second 
examines relationships between single- and multiple-ancestry popula-
tions of Somali and Ethiopian ancestry.
A. Estimates of Ancestry and Country of Birth in U.S. Statistics
Discrepancies between reported ancestry and reported birth national-
ity probably arise from two sources. Using Ethiopia as an example, if 
15
people report Ethiopian ancestry but not Ethiopian birth, this indicates 
the presence of “ethnically” Ethiopian populations born either in the 
U.S. or in a third country. Conversely, if people report Ethiopian birth 
but not Ethiopian ancestry, this indicates the presence of individuals 
who were born in Ethiopia but identify themselves with non-Ethio-
pian ethnicities. To control for large variations in the ethno-national 
populations among counties, I use the basic proportion of ancestry to 
birth, obtained by dividing the total population reporting Ethiopian, 
Kenyan, or Somali ancestry by the total estimated population born in 
the respective country, for each county in the U.S. (total=3,074 coun-
ties) which reported the presence of these populations.33 To return to 
the illustration, a county reporting more people of Ethiopian ancestry 
than of birth in Ethiopia has a proportion greater than 1, whereas 
more people of Ethiopian birth than ancestry in a county is indicated 
by a proportion between 0 and 1. (Again, for Somalia, the statistic of 
reported Somalian birth was only available for 2015.) Results are tabu-
lated in Table 2.
Table 2. Mean Proportions of Ancestry to Birth in U.S. Counties with Popu-
lations Reporting Ethiopian, Kenyan, or Somali Ancestry or Birth
Country of 
Ancestry/
Birth
Year N Mean Proportion, Ancestry to Birth
Median  
Proportion
Ethiopia 2009 454 1.239 1.0
2010 497 1.417 1.0
2011 610 1.363 1.0
2013 682 1.266 1.0
2014 726 1.237 1.0
2015 754 1.331 1.0
Kenya 2009 498 0.465 0.299
2010 521 0.529 0.333
2011 568 0.552 0.328
2013 599 0.529 0.348
2014 618 0.494 0.336
2015 654 0.526 0.332
Somalia 2015 289 1.424 1.0
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The proportion of Ethiopian-ancestry to Ethiopian-born populations 
across counties that reported these numbers was essentially consis-
tent.34 The proportion of Kenyan-ancestry to Kenyan-born populations 
was similarly consistent, but much lower than for Ethiopians or Soma-
lis. This makes it more difficult to compare, so I will focus on Ethiopi-
ans and Somalians. While the proportion of Somali ancestry to birth 
in Somalia appears higher than the proportions for Ethiopia, an inde-
pendent t-test suggests the difference is not statistically significant. In 
other words, the proportion of Ethiopian-ancestry to Ethiopian-born 
is similar to the proportion of Somali-ancestry to Somalia-born across 
U.S. counties reporting these populations. Such general tests, however, 
elide the different histories of these groups. Given that the Ethiopian-
born population was ten times larger in 1990 than the Somalian-born 
population — and only 1.2 times larger in 2015 — I would expect a 
higher proportion of native-born Ethiopians than native-born Somalis 
to be captured in the data. The high proportion of Somali ancestry to 
Somali birth indicates that a significant portion of ethnic Somalis in the 
U.S. report birth/national origins in locations other than Somalia, and 
considering the relatively recent influx of Somalis to the U.S., probably 
outside of the U.S. as well.
In order to eliminate possible bias from counties with very small 
populations of Somalis or Ethiopians, I subset the above dataset into 
two separate groups of counties, one of which includes only counties 
for which the estimated populations of Somali ancestry and of Ethio-
pian birth were at least 50 (n=93), and a second including only counties 
for which the estimated population of Somali ancestry and the popu-
lation of Kenyan birth were both at least 50 (n=111) in 2015.35 There 
is significant overlap between these two subsets, so it is unsurpris-
ing that the mean proportion of Somali ancestry to Somalian birth is 
approximately equal in each of them (Table 3). What is notable is that 
the proportion of Somali ancestry to Somalian birth within these sub-
sets of counties is higher than the proportion in the wider set of coun-
ties. Within both subsets, the estimated population reporting Somali 
ancestry is nearly twice the estimated Somalia-born population. For 
both subsets, the proportion for Somalis is significantly higher than the 
proportion for Ethiopians/Kenyans (p<0.001). For the Ethiopia-born 
population subset, the 95% confidence interval indicates that the mean 
proportion for Somalis is 0.22-0.72 (16–52%) higher than for Ethiopians. 
If one assumes an approximately equivalent proportion of U.S.-born 
second- and third-generation individuals among both populations (a 
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conservative assumption given that the longer history of Ethiopians in 
the U.S. would suggest a higher proportion of U.S.-born Ethiopians), 
the data suggest that at least 16% of first-generation people identifying 
themselves as ethnic Somalis — and likely upwards of 20 or 25% — in 
the U.S. are not Somalia-born. This would include Somalis from Ethio-
pia and Kenya as well as those born in third countries.
Table 3. Mean Proportion of Ancestry to Birth, Selected Counties
Country of 
Ancestry/
Birth
Year N Mean Proportion, Ancestry to Birth
Median  
Proportion
(Counties with Somali-ancestry and Ethiopia-born population both at least 50)
Somalia 2015 91 1.835 1.552
Ethiopia 2015 92 1.364 1.282
(Counties with Somali-ancestry and Kenya-born population both at least 50)
Somalia 2015 108 1.858 1.595
Kenya 2015 110 0.412 0.402
If some of the ethnic Somali population not born in Somalia is com-
prised of Ethiopian Somalis who have reported Ethiopian birth in sur-
veys, I would expect a negative correlation between the proportion of 
Somalis to Somalia-born and the proportion of Ethiopians to Ethiopia-
born. That is, in counties with high populations of Ethiopia-born Soma-
lis, there should be a relatively high proportion of Somali ancestry to 
birth in Somalia, and a relatively low proportion of Ethiopian ancestry 
to Ethiopian birth. Plotting the set of 92 counties, this is indeed what 
the data suggests, although the correlation is weak (R2 = 0.035), influ-
enced in part by the skewed distribution of counties in which some 
report extremely high Somali or Ethiopian proportions (Figure 4).
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Figure 4: Proportion of Somali Descent to Somalian Birth Plotted against 
Proportion of Ethiopian Descent to Ethiopian Birth for 93 U.S. Counties. 
Dotted lines indicate the mean proportion for each population. Blue trend 
line indicates linear regression fit (R2=0.035) and shaded area is 95% confi-
dence interval for regression line. Data from 2015 ACS estimates.
Plotting this subset of counties on a map of U.S. counties reveals 
some geographic trends that are hardly surprising given what is 
known of the distribution of Somalis in the U.S. The maps in Figure 5 
are shaded in relation to the distribution of proportions for the Somali 
and Ethiopian populations, the mean and median of which are given 
above in Table 3. Counties shaded red and orange indicate a propor-
tion of below 1; shades of yellow indicate first and second quartile; the 
lightest shade of green indicates a proportion falling in the third quar-
tile but below the mean, and darker shades of green indicate a propor-
tion falling in the third quartile and above the mean, and a proportion 
falling in the fourth quartile. From the maps, it can be seen, for exam-
ple, that every county in Minnesota falls above the median proportion 
for Somalis, and four of nine counties in Minnesota fall above the mean 
for Somalis, whereas four of nine fall below the median for Ethiopians, 
and six of nine below the mean.
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Taken together, this analysis indicates at a high level of confidence 
that Ethiopian Somalis (and likely Kenyan Somalis as well, although 
the data for Kenya are less comparable) make up a significant por-
tion of the ethnic Somali population in the U.S. and are discernible in 
aggregate population data.
Figure 5: Map of 93 U.S. Counties Reporting Populations of at least 50  
with Somali Ancestry and at least 50 of Ethiopian Birth in 2015,  
Showing Proportion of Somali Ancestry to Somalian Birth (top) and  
Ethiopian Ancestry to Ethiopian Birth (bottom).
B. Multiple Ancestries in the U.S.
A second method of attempting to discern non-Somalian ethnic Somali 
populations is enabled by 2009–2015 ACS data on ancestry which can 
be broken down into populations reporting single and populations 
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reporting multiple ancestry. Analyzing the same subset of counties 
employed above with Somali-ancestry and Ethiopia-born populations 
of at least 50 in 2015 (n=93) may suggest whether this second approach 
supports the indications in the previous section regarding the presence 
of non-Somalian Somalis in the ACS data.
To situate the reporting of multiple ancestries within this subset of 
counties in the larger context, there is no discernible indication in the 
data that people in the U.S. are increasingly reporting multiple rather 
than single ancestries. The total population reporting multiple ances-
try of any type (not just Somali or Ethiopian) across 2,975 counties in 
the continental U.S. remained relatively consistent and even declined 
slightly from 26.1% in 2009 to 24.7% in 2015 (t=-18.75, p<0.001). For 
the 93 counties in the subset, the total population reporting multiple 
ancestry of any type also decreased slightly from 28.6% to 28.2% (t= 
-1.99, p<0.05). During the same period, the population reporting mul-
tiple-ancestry-Ethiopian rose from 9.3% of the total population report-
ing Ethiopian ancestry in 2009 to 14.9% in 2015 (t=2.2, p<0.05). The 
population reporting multiple-ancestry-Somali rose even more sharply 
from a very low 3.7% of the total Somali-ancestry population in 2009 to 
11% in 2015 (t=3.15, p<0.01). On average across all 93 counties, this shift 
took place between 2009 and 2012, with the proportion of the Somali-
ancestry population reporting multiple-ancestry-Somali increasing 
nearly fourfold (Figure 6).
Figure 6: Average Population Reporting Multiple-Ancestry-Somali and 
Multiple-Ancestry-Ethiopian, as a Proportion of the Total Population 
Reporting Somali and Ethiopian Ancestry, respectively. Data from ACS 
2009–2015, 93 counties with Somali and Ethiopian populations of at least 50.
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Considering only the fourteen counties for which Somali-ancestry 
and Ethiopia-born populations are each estimated at over 1,000, the 
trend is consistent, although populations reporting multiple ancestry 
make up a lower percentage of the overall Somali- and Ethiopian-
ancestry populations (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Average Population Reporting Multiple-Ancestry-Somali  
and Multiple-Ancestry-Ethiopian, as a Proportion of the Total Population 
Reporting Somali and Ethiopian Ancestry, respectively. Data from ACS 
2009–2015, 14 counties with Somali and Ethiopian populations of  
at least 1,000.
A few scenarios could give rise to such a sharp increase in reports 
of multiple ancestry among Somalis. First, the increase could reflect 
the expansion of a locally born population of mixed Somali ancestry 
in locations where relatively high populations of Somalis have settled 
in the U.S. (perhaps reporting multiple-ancestry-Somali and multiple-
ancestry-American). Nevertheless, even assuming a high birthrate, 
such an increase is unlikely to generate such a sharp jump in the pro-
portion of the Somali-ancestry population reporting multiple ances-
try, given the continued arrival of Somalis from Somalia during this 
period. Second, the increase could reflect the arrival in these counties 
from elsewhere of populations of mixed Somali ancestry, whether born 
in the U.S. or perhaps ethnic Somalis from Kenya and Ethiopia. Again, 
I would expect this to be offset proportionally by the continued arrival 
of Somalian Somalis during this time, which was equal to or greater 
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than the arrival of Ethiopian- and Kenyan-born populations (Figure 3). 
A third possibility is that a population of ethnic Somalis tracing their 
national origins outside of Somalia (e.g., Ethiopia and Kenya) began to 
explicitly identify themselves with such multiple origins in surveys.
If Somalis who had previously identified as single-ancestry-Somali 
were shifting identification to multiple-ancestry-Somali and multi-
ple-ancestry-Ethiopian, this would entail an increase in the popula-
tion reporting multiple-ancestry-Ethiopian combined with a sharper 
increase in the proportion of the Somali-ancestry population reporting 
multiple-ancestry-Somali. This is consistent with trends in the dataset. 
Perspectives of return migrants indicate that these years were precisely 
when return migration to Somali Regional State began to accelerate. 
One Ethiopian Somali who arrived in the U.S. in 1984 first returned 
to Jigjiga in 2004. I asked him if a lot of people started going back 
around that time. He responded, “Not a lot of people . . . in Somali 
Region, most people went back maybe 2009, 2010. A lot of people went 
back then.”36 Diaspora returnees in Jigjiga confirmed this assessment: 
In 2010, Abdi Mohamoud Omar, the president of Ethiopia’s Somali 
Regional State, visited the U.S. to invite the Ethiopian-Somali diaspora 
home. According to one returnee from Columbus, Ohio, “he gave us 
a lot of confidence,” which encouraged people to apply for Ethiopian 
diaspora IDs and return to their country of birth.”37
The proportional change in estimates of multiple-Somali and mul-
tiple-Ethiopian ancestry from 2009–2015 support indications that a 
number of Somali Ethiopians may have begun to identify themselves 
more explicitly as both Somali and Ethiopian during this time period. 
For the 93 counties in the dataset, the estimated population reporting 
single-ancestry-Ethiopian increased by an average of 177%, while the 
estimated population reporting single-ancestry-Somali increased by 
an average of 86% (Table 4). These numbers are heavily influenced by 
some counties that saw more than tenfold increases in single-ancestry-
Ethiopian or -Somali populations during this time. Nevertheless, the 
average increase in multiple-ancestry populations was higher than the 
increase in single-ancestry populations — although, especially among 
Somalis, the increase in reported multiple ancestry appears to be 
driven by a sharp increase in relatively few counties.
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Table 4. Proportional Changes in Reported Ancestries, 2009–2015 
Ancestry Variable N Mean Median
Ethiopian Single ancestry 84 1.766 0.706
Multiple ancestry 58 3.460 1.548
Somali Single ancestry 74 0.866 0.337
Multiple ancestry 28 2.808 0.275
It is revealing to consider how these shifts appear in counties that 
had well-established Somali and/or Ethiopian populations by 2009. 
I took a subset of counties with large Ethiopian and Somali popula-
tions from metropolitan Los Angeles (Los Angeles County), Atlanta 
(DeKalb), Washington, D.C. (Montgomery, Maryland and Fairfax, 
Virginia), Minneapolis-St. Paul (Hennepin and Ramsey), Las Vegas 
(Clark), Dallas (Dallas), and Seattle (King). While this subset yields a 
small number of cases, the same patterns are visible as in the larger set. 
Furthermore, despite the small sample, the difference in the mean pro-
portional change in reported ancestry between single-ancestry-Ethi-
opian and multiple-ancestry-Ethiopian was statistically significant at 
95% confidence. Tentatively then, given the small sample size, the pro-
portion of the Somali and Ethiopian populations reporting multiple 
ancestry in counties with relatively large populations of Somalis and 
Ethiopians appears to have at least doubled between 2009 and 2015.
Table 5. Change in Reported Ancestries 2009–2015 as Proportion of 2009 
Population, Selected Metro Area Counties
Origin Variable N Mean Median
Ethiopia Single ancestry 9 0.458 0.407
Multiple ancestry 9 4.199 1.998
Somali Single ancestry 9 0.622 0.372
Multiple ancestry 6 3.567 2.543
A final way to visualize and compare these multiple-ancestry popu-
lations is to plot the multiple-ancestry-Somali and multiple-ancestry-
Ethiopian populations against each other for the set of counties with 
populations of at least 50 Somalis and Ethiopians (n=93). In 2009, there 
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was a positive trend in the data with a relatively weak correlation 
(R2=0.119). The correlations for every subsequent year are higher. In 
2015, the correlation was strongest (R2=0.226) (Figure 8). Individual 
counties have been labeled in Figure 8, plotting multiple-ancestry 
populations in 2009 and 2015, to show the growth of estimated mul-
tiple-ancestry-Somali and -Ethiopian populations in these areas. The 
increasing correlation and dramatic growth of populations reporting 
multiple ancestry supports the suggestions voiced by Ethiopian Soma-
lis I have interviewed that a portion of the ethnic Somali population 
in the U.S. is increasingly identifying itself explicitly as having both 
Somali and Ethiopian ancestry — becoming “more Ethiopian than 
before.”
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Figure 8: Population Reporting Multiple Ancestry-Somali as a Function of 
Population Reporting Multiple-Ancestry-Ethiopian, 2009 (left) and 2015 
(above). Graphs indicate linear regression fit (blue line) and shaded 95% 
confidence interval for regression line. Graph points are shaded by the  
total county population reporting Somali ancestry.
In sum, data on multiple ancestry support indications that Ethio-
pian Somalis (and probably Kenyan Somalis as well) make up sig-
nificant populations among ethnic Somalis in the U.S., and further 
indicate that the population of ethnic Somalis reporting Somali and 
Ethiopian ancestry increased dramatically within the past decade. 
Data from Somali Regional State substantiate this interpretation of 
ACS data. Electronic records of registered returnees available from 
the SRS Ministry of Diaspora were available for returnees register-
ing in 2015.38 The records document 595 returnees in 2015, with 147 
from the U.S. This registry is of first-time returnees and it is worth 
keeping in mind that according to multiple sources, diaspora return 
began to expand in scale from about 2009 onwards. Three of my key 
informants in Atlanta had already returned to Jigjiga at least once 
by 2005. Among returnees registered in 2015, 98 people had regis-
tered phone numbers with discernible U.S. area codes in the records. 
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Minneapolis area codes were predominant (32 numbers), followed by 
Columbus, OH (9), Seattle (6), San Diego (3), and Rochester, MN (2). 
These locations exactly correspond to the six counties with the highest 
populations reporting multiple-ancestry-Somali and significant popu-
lations reporting multiple-ancestry-Ethiopian in 2015 (Figure 8, bottom 
graph): Hennepin/Ramsey, MN; Franklin, OH; King, WA; San Diego, 
CA; and Olmsted, MN. This correspondence in a separate source of 
data confirms that at least some Ethiopian Somalis in these counties 
are asserting this multiple identity by registering as members of the 
Ethiopian diaspora in Somali Region. Such indications also suggest 
that the dramatic increase in the estimated population reporting multi-
ple-ancestry-Somali and multiple-ancestry-Ethiopian in these counties 
are likely at least in part the result of the ongoing mobilization of the 
Ethiopian Somali diaspora.
IV. Conclusion: Somali Regional State and  
the Emergence of an Ethiopian-Somali Diaspora
Ethiopia’s ethnic-federal decentralization in 1995 appears to have 
begun the process of mobilizing a subset of the ethnic Somali dias-
pora across the globe to explicitly recognize their Ethiopian roots, 
take up their Yellow Card (proof of Ethiopian origins), and return to 
their region of origin — or region of their parents’ origins. The Somali 
Regional State President, Abdi Mohamoud Omar, has made a num-
ber of trips abroad in recent years to drum up diaspora support for 
the regional administration. The SRS Ministry of Diaspora promotes 
return migration and diaspora support for the regional administration, 
including hosting diaspora events in Jigjiga as well as sending repre-
sentatives to key locations abroad to meet with diaspora community 
leaders. According to one returnee who invested significant capital in 
a farm outside Jigjiga, “this current government of Ethiopia opened up 
opportunity for the diaspora to invest, and they give you a tax break, 
and — you know, encourage the Ethiopian diaspora to come back to 
the country and invest.”39
This diaspora mobilization that draws together Somali ethnic and 
Ethiopian national identity appears to be showing up in large-scale 
survey data in the U.S. as an increase in people identifying themselves 
as multiple-ancestry-Somali and multiple-ancestry-Ethiopian. The 
increasing relevance of the hybrid identity “Ethiopian Somali” appears 
as a trend not only among ethnic Somalis in eastern Ethiopia, as Hag-
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mann and Khalif argue,40 but also among diaspora Somalis. This trend, 
as well as the general indication of the prevalence of non-Somalian 
Somalis among ethnic Somalis abroad, should challenge academic 
studies as well as news accounts to pay attention to the multiple identi-
ties and political affiliations that cross-cut the broader ethnic Somali 
diaspora. The phenomena described here are certainly not isolated to 
the U.S. context. Though it is beyond the scope of this endeavor, an 
estimate of 20–30% non-Somalian Somalis among ethnic Somalis in 
North America is corroborated by data from Canada’s 2006 census. The 
SRS Ministry of Diaspora records from 2015 also document diaspora 
returnees from twenty countries outside of North America.
The invisibility of non-Somalian Somalis in diaspora stems from a 
combination of at least two elements. Strategic deployment of claims 
to Somalian origins among ethnic Somalis — abetted by the fact that 
many Ethiopian Somalis fled abroad via Somalia — may enable mar-
ginalized groups from the Horn to gain access to spaces of opportunity 
from which they otherwise might be excluded.41 Personal (and perhaps 
some apocryphal) accounts abound of Kenyan Somalis boarding air-
planes using Kenyan passports and then destroying the passports en 
route to claim asylum as Somalis (therefore ostensibly Somalians) in a 
Western country upon arrival. Another type of invisibility stems from 
forms of social erasure associated with state practices of documenta-
tion and the popular assumption (evident in academic literature on the 
topic as well) of correspondence between ethnicity and nationality in 
the case of relatively ethnically homogenous spaces such as Somalia. 
This assumption creates falsely precise boundaries around “the Somali 
diaspora” as a group identifiable with national origins, eliding the 
diversity of national origins, migration trajectories, and potential polit-
ical affiliations among Somalis across the global scene. Such simplistic 
ideas also undergird anti-immigrant discourses in various contexts 
that describe Somalis as chaotic populations of state-destroying terror-
ists or as dependent refugees who drain the social system.42 Further, 
they render virtually invisible non-Somali groups such as Oromo, who 
often live in the same spaces, worship in the same mosques, and inter-
act on a daily basis with Somalis.
One irony of the Ethiopian Somali situation is that it is precisely 
the political definition of territories within Ethiopia along ethnic lines 
that has driven the discernible, though contested, emergence of an 
Ethiopian Somali identity at home and in diaspora. It remains to be 
seen the extent to which this shift in identification among Somalis in 
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diaspora and the recent acceleration in temporary return migration 
may influence identities in Somali Regional State, as well as how new 
links between the Ethiopian state and Ethiopian Somalis abroad may 
generate new directions in political and economic development for the 
historically marginalized Somali Region of Ethiopia.
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6.  This hybrid identification is not strictly a new phenomenon. Recent historical research 
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worship center for Somalis,” The Kansas City Star, 14 October 2016, accessed online.
23. Wettergren and Wikström 2014.
24. Thompson 2017.
25. Formatted data used in this analysis are available from the project dataverse: https://
dataverse.unc.edu/dataverse/capitalintheborderlands.
26. UNDESA 2015.
27. Author’s field notes, 30 May 2017.
28. Interview, 23 January 2017.
29.  Barnes 2000, p. 184.
30. 2012 data was not available through the API at the time of this writing.
31. Glenn 2016.
32. ACS methodology notes that for ethnically diverse countries, reported ancestries 
were grouped by national origins. Thus it is likely, for example, that individuals report-
ing Oromo or Amhara ethnicity, etc., were grouped under “Ethiopian.” Data used here 
are from the total ancestry data Table B04006, for which individuals could report more 
than one ancestry, and Table B05006, reporting a single country of origin.
33. Counties in which people reported Ethiopian, Kenyan, or Somali ancestry but no one 
reported birth in the respective country have a proportion of infinity since the denomi-
nator is 0. These were dropped and the number of counties used in each calculation is 
reported in the tabular results.
34. For all differences in means reported in the following analysis, the base t-test pack-
age in R was employed, with paired t-tests used for populations of the same ancestry/
birth and independent t-tests used to compare different ethnic populations. Results are 
reported where statistically significant.
35. Clayton County, Georgia, was an outlier with a very high proportion of Somali ances-
try to Somali birth, and was removed from both subsets for calculations in this section.
36. Interview, 7 October 2016.
37. Author’s field notes, 17 September 2017.
38. 2007 Ethiopian Calendar.
39. Interview, 7 October 2016.
40. Hagmann and Khalif 2006.
41. Thompson 2017.
42. Wettergren and Wikström 2014.
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SRS Ministry of Diaspora, spreadsheet list of diaspora returnees provided to author in 
June 2016, in author’s possession.
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015). “Trends in Interna-
tional Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin.” United Nations database, 
POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2015.
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